- Leon Aron: How Trump can change Putin’s mind
Editorial: In the intervening years, oil industry experts and other analysts say, as Mr. Putin consolidated his control over Russia’s oligarchs, Mr. Tillerson underwent a profound change of outlook. He came to realize that the key to success in Russia, a country deeply important to Exxon’s future, lay in establishing personal relationships with Mr. Putin and his friend and confidant, Igor Sechin, the powerful head of Rosneft, the state oil company. –New York Times
Unlike its Soviet predecessor, the contemporary Russian military is neither sized nor structured for conquest to the shores of the Atlantic and Mediterranean. But this does not mean it deserves the disdain it often receives in the Western commentariat. Indeed, the Russian military is increasingly capable of helping to achieve what seem to be the Kremlin’s actual strategic objectives in Europe.
Many observers, including some in NATO and Western governments, think Moscow is interested in recreating a Russian sphere of influence and even, if possible, hegemony in its near abroad, including along its western periphery. This objective is apparent from Russia’s seizure of Crimea and intervention in Ukraine but also its earlier war with Georgia, its presence there and in Transdniestr, its strong hand in Belarus, and its domineering rhetoric and provocative military exercises directed towards the Baltic states and other Eastern European nations. Moreover, many Western leaders judge that Russia, more ambitiously, is keen to find ways to corrode or even break the cohesion of the NATO Alliance, thereby diminishing American involvement and opening opportunities for Russian leverage in Europe.
http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/weJvFvMC5kP56DAGPJn6/full
Many observers, including some in NATO and Western governments, think Moscow is interested in recreating a Russian sphere of influence and even, if possible, hegemony in its near abroad, including along its western periphery. This objective is apparent from Russia’s seizure of Crimea and intervention in Ukraine but also its earlier war with Georgia, its presence there and in Transdniestr, its strong hand in Belarus, and its domineering rhetoric and provocative military exercises directed towards the Baltic states and other Eastern European nations. Moreover, many Western leaders judge that Russia, more ambitiously, is keen to find ways to corrode or even break the cohesion of the NATO Alliance, thereby diminishing American involvement and opening opportunities for Russian leverage in Europe.
http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/weJvFvMC5kP56DAGPJn6/full
Leon Aron writes: The current combination of mild economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure is not enough to change Putin’s foreign policy strategy in the near future. The only way to do so is to degrade his domestic support by increasing his domestic political costs. Where and how to confront, contain, and reverse current Russian foreign policy is less important than recognizing that the ultimate strategic goal is to force Putin to shift the foundation of his regime’s legitimacy from the external to the internal: away from an increasingly risky foreign policy and toward a policy to jump-start Russian economic growth through institutional reforms that would improve the investment climate and decrease tensions with the United States. – Foreign Affairs’ Snapshots
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