Keith Payne writes: The long-held notion that uncertainty and ambiguity with regard to Western escalation will be adequate to support deterrence needs to be reconsidered. The historical evidence is overwhelming that uncertainty and ambiguity sometimes are not adequate to deter; explicit and direct threats are necessary in some cases. The Putin regime may be such a case. A useful example of a more direct declaratory policy was provided in 2016 by the then-new British Prime Minister, Theresa May when asked in Parliament if she would ever authorize a nuclear strike. She responded yes without hesitation. – National Institute for Public Policy
LTG David Deptula, USAF (Ret.) writes: As threats become more capable and proliferate, we will need a much larger number of B-21s—the next generation long-range sensor-shooter—than the handful of B-2’s we have at the ready today. The B-21 will become the centerpiece of our Nation’s future power projection capabilities across the spectrum of conflict that we will face. Accordingly, the B-21 must become a key priority in the new Trump Administration if it is to achieve its goal of making our military strong again, and doing so in a cost-effective manner. – Breaking Defense
Adam Lowther writes: [A]t an estimated cost of $60 billion to $80 billion over the next three decades—ten percent of the military’s total planned modernization expenditure—development and fielding of GBSD is an absolute bargain and will offer the greatest return on investment of any modernization effort. In time, the Air Force will undoubtedly make the case to Gen. Mattis for the ICBM — and a compelling case it will be. – Defense One
LTG David Deptula, USAF (Ret.) writes: As threats become more capable and proliferate, we will need a much larger number of B-21s—the next generation long-range sensor-shooter—than the handful of B-2’s we have at the ready today. The B-21 will become the centerpiece of our Nation’s future power projection capabilities across the spectrum of conflict that we will face. Accordingly, the B-21 must become a key priority in the new Trump Administration if it is to achieve its goal of making our military strong again, and doing so in a cost-effective manner. – Breaking Defense
Adam Lowther writes: [A]t an estimated cost of $60 billion to $80 billion over the next three decades—ten percent of the military’s total planned modernization expenditure—development and fielding of GBSD is an absolute bargain and will offer the greatest return on investment of any modernization effort. In time, the Air Force will undoubtedly make the case to Gen. Mattis for the ICBM — and a compelling case it will be. – Defense One
New Threat Realities and Deterrence Requirements
From Keith B. Payne, NIPP: “For most of the previous twenty-five years, US policy increasingly has been captured by three related refrains regarding the post-Cold War era: 1) nuclear terrorism was the remaining greatest threat; 2) nonproliferation was the highest priority and key to countering this greatest threat; and, 3) in turn, US nuclear reductions and limitations were the key to nonproliferation.”
From Keith B. Payne, NIPP: “For most of the previous twenty-five years, US policy increasingly has been captured by three related refrains regarding the post-Cold War era: 1) nuclear terrorism was the remaining greatest threat; 2) nonproliferation was the highest priority and key to countering this greatest threat; and, 3) in turn, US nuclear reductions and limitations were the key to nonproliferation.”
Nuclear Balancing and the Curse of the Heavy ICBM
From Rod Lyon, The Strategist (ASPI): “Stable nuclear balances are those in which neither side feels pressure to fire first. And that typically goes to the shape of an arsenal, not simply its size. Take the case of an arms control agreement between two superpowers to limit their countable nuclear warheads to 1,000. (I use the adjective ‘countable’, because warhead numbers typically depend upon agreed counting rules for specific delivery vehicles.) Country A chooses to deploy 300 single-warhead ICBMs in fixed silos, 600 warheads on multiple-warhead (MIRVed) missiles at sea, and 100 warheads on its long-range strategic bombers. Country B chooses to build 100 ICBMs, each with 10 warheads, in fixed silos.”
From Rod Lyon, The Strategist (ASPI): “Stable nuclear balances are those in which neither side feels pressure to fire first. And that typically goes to the shape of an arsenal, not simply its size. Take the case of an arms control agreement between two superpowers to limit their countable nuclear warheads to 1,000. (I use the adjective ‘countable’, because warhead numbers typically depend upon agreed counting rules for specific delivery vehicles.) Country A chooses to deploy 300 single-warhead ICBMs in fixed silos, 600 warheads on multiple-warhead (MIRVed) missiles at sea, and 100 warheads on its long-range strategic bombers. Country B chooses to build 100 ICBMs, each with 10 warheads, in fixed silos.”
The 5 Best Aircraft Carriers in Naval History
From James Holmes, The National Interest: “Anyone who's tried to compare one piece of kit—ships, aircraft, weaponry of various types—to another will testify to how hard this chore is. Ranking aircraft carriers is no exception. Consulting the pages of Jane's Fighting Ships or Combat Fleets of the World sheds some light on the problem. For instance, a flattop whose innards house a nuclear propulsion plant boasts virtually unlimited cruising range, whereas a carrier powered by fossil fuels is tethered to its fuel source. As Alfred Thayer Mahan puts it, a conventional warship bereft of bases or a coterie of logistics ships is a "land bird" unable to fly far from home.”
From James Holmes, The National Interest: “Anyone who's tried to compare one piece of kit—ships, aircraft, weaponry of various types—to another will testify to how hard this chore is. Ranking aircraft carriers is no exception. Consulting the pages of Jane's Fighting Ships or Combat Fleets of the World sheds some light on the problem. For instance, a flattop whose innards house a nuclear propulsion plant boasts virtually unlimited cruising range, whereas a carrier powered by fossil fuels is tethered to its fuel source. As Alfred Thayer Mahan puts it, a conventional warship bereft of bases or a coterie of logistics ships is a "land bird" unable to fly far from home.”
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