Nine Links in the Chain:
The Weaponized Narrative, Sun Tzu, and the Essence of War
By Jon Herrmann, Strategy Bridge: “Decades ago, the unprecedented power of nuclear weapons required new adaptations of strategy. Now, the unprecedented power of weaponized narrative requires new adaptation of strategy.”
The Weaponized Narrative, Sun Tzu, and the Essence of War
By Jon Herrmann, Strategy Bridge: “Decades ago, the unprecedented power of nuclear weapons required new adaptations of strategy. Now, the unprecedented power of weaponized narrative requires new adaptation of strategy.”
Ends, Ways, Means: Strategy Nicked by Occam’s Razor
By John Callaway, RealClearDefense: “ML Cavanaugh rightfully decries the oversimplification of strategy as a formula in “It’s Time to End the Tyranny of Ends, Ways, and Means.” The article begins to challenge the construction of strategy as ends, ways, and means but then decides it is a useful tool, with the excellent insight that ends, ways, means as a formula is useful as a feasibility check for strategy. Unfortunately, Cavanaugh then springboards away from the critique of strategy as a formula to the overly general need to think of strategy as a theory. The bottom line is that strategists and policy makers must break away from the deceptive simplicity of ends, ways, and means in order to develop coherent strategy. And while an articulation of ends, ways, and means should not be considered a strategy, a new heuristic is needed to break from the current mold.”
By John Callaway, RealClearDefense: “ML Cavanaugh rightfully decries the oversimplification of strategy as a formula in “It’s Time to End the Tyranny of Ends, Ways, and Means.” The article begins to challenge the construction of strategy as ends, ways, and means but then decides it is a useful tool, with the excellent insight that ends, ways, means as a formula is useful as a feasibility check for strategy. Unfortunately, Cavanaugh then springboards away from the critique of strategy as a formula to the overly general need to think of strategy as a theory. The bottom line is that strategists and policy makers must break away from the deceptive simplicity of ends, ways, and means in order to develop coherent strategy. And while an articulation of ends, ways, and means should not be considered a strategy, a new heuristic is needed to break from the current mold.”
Why Strategy Is Easy but Difficult (at the Same Time)
By M.L.R. Smith, Infinity Journal: “One of the virtues of strategic theory, when properly understood, is that it can dispel clichés and easy assumptions that often abound in popular debate. One of the more obvious timeworn phrases is the notion of military victory or a military solution. Public commentary will frequently refer to one protagonist or another as seeking a military victory or proclaim that a particular problem can, or cannot, be solved by military means alone.”
By M.L.R. Smith, Infinity Journal: “One of the virtues of strategic theory, when properly understood, is that it can dispel clichés and easy assumptions that often abound in popular debate. One of the more obvious timeworn phrases is the notion of military victory or a military solution. Public commentary will frequently refer to one protagonist or another as seeking a military victory or proclaim that a particular problem can, or cannot, be solved by military means alone.”
Speed, Volume, and Ubiquity: Forget Information Operations & Focus on the Information Environment
By Michael Williams, Strategy Bridge: “U.S. military doctrine began well enough in the 1990s to answer the question of what the mission and functions of information operations are and should be. As the impact of the information environment has grown, however, doctrine writers continues to narrow the focus in subsequent iterations of information operations doctrine by attempting to narrow the field to specific capabilities or to suggest the role of information operations was to integrate specific capabilities in support of operational and tactical objectives.”
By Michael Williams, Strategy Bridge: “U.S. military doctrine began well enough in the 1990s to answer the question of what the mission and functions of information operations are and should be. As the impact of the information environment has grown, however, doctrine writers continues to narrow the focus in subsequent iterations of information operations doctrine by attempting to narrow the field to specific capabilities or to suggest the role of information operations was to integrate specific capabilities in support of operational and tactical objectives.”
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