By Yasmin Tadjdeh, National Defense Magazine: "The defense industrial base is on a negative trajectory as companies grapple with deteriorating conditions for industrial security and the availability and cost of skilled labor and materials, according to a new report released Feb. 5."
Can Warfighters Remain the Masters of AI? by Harrison Schramm and Jeff Kline
Report Finds U.S. Defense Industrial Base in Decline
By Yasmin Tadjdeh, National Defense Magazine: "The defense industrial base is on a negative trajectory as companies grapple with deteriorating conditions for industrial security and the availability and cost of skilled labor and materials, according to a new report released Feb. 5."
AMERICA'S FUTURE CONFLICT WITH CHINA EMERGES; WHAT THE COLD WAR TAUGHT DEFENSE ABOUT UNITY OF PURPOSE; aei's scholars on putin, war budgets and german political unity
China’s Modernizing Military
By Lindsay Maizland, Council on Foreign Relations: "The People’s Liberation Army is aiming to become the dominant force in the Asia-Pacific, strengthening China’s hand toward Taiwan and international disputes in the South China Sea.
China and Nuclear Restraint
By Rod Lyon, The Strategist (ASPI): "China increasingly finds itself depicted as the bête noire of nuclear arms control. The U.S. government has said the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty collapsed because of Chinese actions outside the treaty and not merely Russian violations inside it."
China’s Growing 5G Dominance Is a Disaster for U.S. Security
By Charlie Kirk, The Hill: "China’s influence over the fifth generation of wireless technology, more commonly known as 5G, is a lot more important than some TV commercials might have you believe."
Is the U.S. Public Sleepwalking Into a Sino-Centric World Order?
By Lulio Vargas-Cohen, RealClearDefense: "While the U.S. is at a cros sroads in navigating the most important foreign policy issue of the century, the U.S. public remains unengaged about the importance of getting U.S.-China relations right."
Three Huge Defense Threats for Which U.S. Is Woefully Under-Prepared
By Loren Thompson, Forbes: "The United States outspends every other nation on defense, and as a result has the best trained, best equipped military in the world. The joint force regularly undertakes missions that no other country's military would be capable of executing. However, there are existential defense threats for which the nation is not prepared . . ."
Not Another Peloponnesian War: Great Power Collaboration?
By Jack Bowers, Strategy Bridge: "The narrative of great-power competition relies largely on a realist discourse reflected in the well-known plot of the Thucydides Trap."
Options for a Joint Support Service
By Jason Hughes, Divergent Options: ". . . without dynamic modernization solutions the DoD will be unable to sharpen the American Military’s competitive edge and realize the National Defense Strategy’s vision of a more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force. While DoD’s strategic guidance has evolved, its force structure has not."
The State Department’s Dysfunction Predates Pompeo
By Kori Schake, Bloomberg Opinion: "Bad as he is, the Secretary of Swagger isn’t entirely to blame for the crisis of American diplomacy."
Why We Need A New Cold War Strategic Approach
If the United States cannot better align its actions, messaging, and strategy and do it in a unified fashion — as it did during the Cold War — it risks reductions to military readiness and our ability to effectively compete with adversaries.
In a new AEI report, Hal Brands discusses how the US can apply lessons from Cold War political warfare to modern competition with China and Russia. An understanding of political warfare is essential to succeed in the intellectual and geopolitical aspects of great-power competition today. Read the full report here.
Mackenzie Eaglen assesses the winners and losers of the Pentagon report. Due to difficult trade-offs by the Pentagon, it now needs a partner in the legislative branch. Finish it here.
Hal Brands in a Bloomberg op-ed. When we argue about Germany in 1990, we’re arguing about what America has done in the world since then — and what it should be doing today. Finish it here.
Leon Aron in an Atlantic op-ed. Putin can’t imagine Russia without himself at the center, especially when the regime he built is on the verge of destabilization. Read it here.
Rwanda: How long can a dictator’s malign acts go unpunished by an uncritical media?
Roger Bate | AEIdeas
AFRICOM’s Assessment of U.S. Security Challenges in Africa
By Yacqub Ismail, International Policy Digest: “In the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy, which serves as a guidance for the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. government prioritized addressing security challenges from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as well as violent extremist groups. AFRICOM’s new strategic approach to secure its interests on the continent are guided by the following: partner for success; compete to win; and, maintain pressure on non-state actors."
The Three-Block War, Strategic Corporals, and the Future Battlefield
By Franklin Annis, Modern War Institute: “In the 1990s, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps Gen Charles C. Krulak advanced the idea of what he called a “three-block war” to explain battlefield realities in an era of failed and failing nation-states. Not only was the Marine Corps operating in complex environments and executing a range of missions—including humanitarian aid and peacekeeping, alongside mid-intensity conflict—it was also operating in an atmosphere of pervasive media coverage."
Mattis and Stavridis on Military-to-Civilian Leadership
By John Waters, Omaha World-Herald: “How did George Washington pull together the revolutionary army? It was very boring. It was listen and learn. (The leader) is actually there to coach them and be with them”: Jim Mattis said this to me over the phone in early January, noting that he applied the “listen and learn” technique to his own transition from four-star general to secretary of defense."
Remarks on the book by its author It is impossible to formulate the answers to the complex strategic uncertainties we now face unless we first ask the appropriate questions. This is what I have attempted to do in my new book, UnCivilization: Urban Geopolitics in a Time of Chaos:1 to frame questions. And to postulate paths to the answers.
When, for example, will the modern world abandon its obsessive - and self-destructive - preoccupation with the tactical threat of terrorism, and begin to focus on the greater strategic context? How do we deal with the fragility of our now-profound dependence on energy, and the attendant long logistical lines to supply it, for every function of civilization, progress, and survival?
How and when will the lights of the great urban spread of mankind begin to flicker and falter? Will they shine brightly into the night in new places, or be sustained still in the cities which we have burnished with our familiarity? What follows when the ships and their cargoes of oil and goods come with less frequency? What happens when the surge in population peaks and suddenly goes into rapid decline? What happens to the balanced nation-state when the preponderance of the world's population lives in cities?
Will all or some of this happen soon? Will it happen at all? And what will be the result of all of this?
Is transformational change already upon us? Have we, in the midst of our striving for greater "democracy", emerged into a situation where - in most of our modern societies - the greater populations are subjects to their governments, rather than the intended goal that governments should be subject to the people? Is this part of the sclerosis of accumulated laws and entitlements?
Change for the most part occurs inexorably over the seemingly gentle sea of history; grinding, like the mills of God, slowly, but exceeding fine. What makes change tolerable - and strategic affairs manageable - is that this evolution usually appears to occur imperceptibly and with the calmness of moss growing on old logs. Sudden change causes disorientation and panic, both to individuals and societies.
The period into which we are now embarking will involve much sudden change. The familiarity of old routines, established forms, and familiar hierarchies will, in many respects, disappear. It is, indeed, already happening. And it has happened before. It is how societies, cultures, and civilizations emerge or evaporate. Individuals and societies can, however, adapt to new realities, both good and bad. In the process, they often forget the paths and triggers which led to the dramatic watersheds thrust upon them. Most people, and most societies, do not have a conscious view of their past or their future; they merely react. They are swept in a storm of reaction, and have no control over it, no understanding of it. They are the last leaves of autumn swept by blustering air, whose movement was dictated by the pull of a distant moon, the heat of a distant sun. Like the leaves, they question not the cause of their present situation, even if they bemoan their fate.
I wrote this new book, UnCivilization, to gain a measure of our present shape, as a human society, and to understand whence the gale has its origins, and whither it will dispatch us.
EXAMINING THE STATE OF US MISSILE DEFENSES & WHY THE NAVY MUST INTEGRATE TO TAKE ON CHINA IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
Iranian Missiles and Americans Exposed
By Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, RealClearDefense: “President Trump boasted in military in his State of the Union address Wednesday night. Trump is right that the military has received significant investments during his tenure. But recent events also reveal where there are vulnerabilities."
U.S. Missile Defense Woefully Prepared for 21st Century Threats
By Jared Whitley, RealClearDefense: “Whereas mutually assured destruction kept the world relatively safe during the Cold War, the proliferation of nuclear capabilities has turned Planet Earth into a ticking, radioactive timebomb."
To Deter China, the Naval Services Must Integrate
By Mike Gallagher, War on the Rocks: “Change on the scale envisioned by the National Defense Strategy isn't always easy, or pretty. Observers of American strategy often wonder how the United States will focus on great power competition when it cannot escape the gravitational pull of the Middle East. This is a worthy topic of debate and causes me no small amount of consternation as well. But even as Washington might look for ways to bring its commitments in the Middle East to a more sustainable level, let's not ignore the lessons simmering conflicts there and elsewhere have for facing down great powers in the Indo-Pacific and Europe."
U.S.-China Competition in Asia: Who Risks Wins
By Sam Roggeveen, the interpreter: “The two key questions for America’s allies in Asia are how long do they want to maintain a U.S.-centered strategic posture, and when do they start preparing for a post-American future?"
China in the Levant
By John Toolan Jr., John Bird & Harry Hoshovsky, RealClearDefense: “Over the past decade, we’ve seen great power jockeying return to the Eastern Mediterranean with China using its deep pockets to secure influence with key U.S. allies as a means to further its global ambitions and adversely impact the United States’ national security interests."
Richard Matlock writes: Over the past five years, missile threats have evolved far more rapidly than conventional wisdom had predicted. […]The 2019 Missile Defense Review called for a comprehensive approach to countering regional missiles of all kinds and from whatever source, as well as the increasingly complex intercontinental ballistic missiles from rogue states. But programs and budgets have not yet aligned with the policy. The upcoming defense budget submission presents an important opportunity to address these new and complex challenges. – Defense News
The First Element–Leadership and Combat Power
By Jeff Barta & Patrick O'Keefe, The Company Leader: "What does it take to bring the full power of the U.S. Army to bear upon enemies of America?"
Thinking Before Shooting: Intelligence and Special Operations
By Steve Balestrieri, SOFREP: “The last 16 years have seen our forces fighting a different kind of war, with a different set of parameters. But we shouldn’t forget the hard lessons learned through the decades of the Cold War. Because we’re going to need them."
Whose National Interest? Which Foreign Policy?
By Michael Colebrook, Strategy Bridge: "Foreign policy consensus is rare in America, just as moral consensus is the stuff of fairy tales. However, difficulty in reaching agreement is no excuse to succumb to relativism or blind fatalism."
HOW CHINA ENVISIONS WAR WITH THE US & EXAMINING THE WORLD'S LARGEST NUCLEAR PROLIFERATORS, IRAN AND CHINA
“Unrestricted Warfare is a book on military strategy written in 1999 by two colonels in the People's Liberation Army, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. Its primary concern is how a nation such as China can defeat a technologically superior opponent through a variety of means.”
David Rennie, The Economist magazine in Beijing; writes the “Chaguan” column; in re: Artificial intelligence; the contest between the US and China. From the first Cold War: how adversaries can agree not to destroy each other: even when you don't trust each other at all, you can nonetheless discuss a new technology that could abruptly change everything, destroy everything. Now we have three, not two, parties: Russia, US, China. Even during the Cold War, you could send an inspector to see what was being done; but no way to see an algorithm. . . . Unenforceable compliance. We’re left making a distinction: countries’ saying it’s best not to have this technology; but among major powers (not rogue powers), it’s possible for large countries to agree that biowar, for example, is unimaginably dangerous & stupid, just not worth having. . . . The PLA is focussed on nonnuclear war.
.. .. ..
In 1999 the Chinese released a book entitled, Unrestricted Warfare. Commentary: “. . . PLA doctrine. . . . has focused on developing a joint operation doctrine for fighting limited, high-intensity conflicts using high-tech weapons.”
The first complete history of Central Eurasia from ancient times to the present day, Empires of the Silk Road represents a fundamental rethinking of the origins, history, and significance of this major world region. Christopher Beckwith describes the rise and fall of the great Central Eurasian empires, including those of the Scythians, Attila the Hun, the Turks and Tibetans, and Genghis Khan and the Mongols. In addition, he explains why the heartland of Central Eurasia led the world economically, scientifically, and artistically for many centuries despite invasions by Persians, Greeks, Arabs, Chinese, and others. In retelling the story of the Old World from the perspective of Central Eurasia, Beckwith provides a new understanding of the internal and external dynamics of the Central Eurasian states and shows how their people repeatedly revolutionized Eurasian civilization.
Beckwith recounts the Indo-Europeans' migration out of Central Eurasia, their mixture with local peoples, and the resulting development of the Graeco-Roman, Persian, Indian, and Chinese civilizations; he details the basis for the thriving economy of premodern Central Eurasia, the economy's disintegration following the region's partition by the Chinese and Russians in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the damaging of Central Eurasian culture by Modernism; and he discusses the significance for world history of the partial reemergence of Central Eurasian nations after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Empires of the Silk Road places Central Eurasia within a world historical framework and demonstrates why the region is central to understanding the history of civilization.
The Conventional Wisdom on China’s Island Bases Is Dangerously Wrong
By Gregory B. Poling, War on the Rocks: “Last month, during a conference on China's maritime ambitions, I was asked a question I often get about Beijing's artificial island bases in the South China Sea. That question goes something like this: Couldn't the United States easily neutralize these remote outposts in a conflict, negating their value?"
Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare
By Jeffrey Engstrom, Rand: "How the Chinese People's Liberation Army seeks to wage modern warfare."
South China Sea: Malaysia, Indonesia, And Vietnam Beat China At Its Own Game
By Panos Mourdoukoutas, Forbes: "Malaysia has joined Indonesia and Vietnam to beat China at its own game in the South China Sea (SCS): The use of lawfare to settle disputes."
CSIS Bad Idea: Debating Grand Strategy
It is fitting that the last in our series from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on “Bad Ideas in National Security” should center on the role of ‘grand strategy’ in US foreign and military policy. Readers of history will recall that the pre-eminent grand strategy of the Cold War was ‘containment’ of…
CSIS Bad Idea: Assuming the ‘Small Wars’ Era is Over
By Alexandra Evans & Alexandra Stark, Breaking Defense: “Intended as a prudent reprioritization, the dramatic shift in demand for more “great power gurus” threatens to shelve the experience and institutional knowledge accumulated over the last two decades."
Is The Mediterranean Still Geo-Strategically Essential?
By Barry Strauss, Strategika: "The Mediterranean Sea is today, as it has always been, a crossroads. The name itself testifies to that, as it means “the sea in the middle of the earth,” a Latin term reflecting an earlier Greek belief. We know better, or do we?"
CSIS Bad Idea: Pulling The Troops Home
Alliances, including forward-stationing of US forces abroad, make the United States safer, its allies more secure, and all more prosperous.
2019 Hot Spots: The Year in Eleven Maps
By Claire Felter, Council on Foreign Relations: “In 2019, long-simmering geopolitical conflicts returned to the fore, migration crises swelled in the Americas, and human rights abuses raised alarm in countries around the world. CFR collects its most relevant maps on the past year’s biggest global developments."
‘Right on Our Doorstep’: Secret Sub Reveals China’s Chilling Plan
By Jamie Seidel, news.com.au: "After years of domination in the South China Sea, Chinese submarines have started popping up somewhere new."
Schriver, Pentagon Asia policy lead, exits building
(Defense News) Randall Schriver, the defense department’s top policy official for Asia, has left the Pentagon.
Present at the demolition
Matthew Continetti | The Washington Free Beacon
The post–World War II order is ending, and so far nothing has replaced it. As the legacy of the 20th century recedes into the past, the only 21st-century alternatives are offered from an authoritarian surveillance state.
Taking the fight to the kleptocrats
Dalibor Rohac | The American Interest
America and the Kurds
By John “Mick” Bednarek & Svante E. Cornell, RealClearDefense: "Much of the outrage and frustration for the U.S. withdrawal from Syria focused on America’s long-standing relationship with the Kurds, without differentiating between Kurdish groups."
Strategic and Geographic Fluency, South America Style
By James Holmes, Proceedings: "Long ago an inscription at the Temple of Apollo at Delphi advised supplicants to know thyself. Chinese sage Sun Tzu outdid the Greek oracle, instructing disciples to know the enemy and know yourself. Heed this counsel and in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."
JSTARS Faces a New Era Outside CENTCOM
By Rachel S. Cohen, Air Force Magazine: "Air Combat Command has pulled its E-8C Joint STARS fleet out of the Middle East after 18 years, another change for the platform that recently saw its long-running replacement effort cancelled and is ramping up in-house maintenance."
Marine Corps Training Shifts to Great Power Competition
By Stew Magnuson, National Defense Magazine: "“We want to get good at that again,” Reid said. “It’s not just about training the tactics. It’s about systems. It’s about thought processes. It’s about — when you’re facing somebody that has equal or better equipment than you, that is as dedicated to the fight as you — can you make rapid decisions by taking in information and then implement those decisions across kind of a domain challenged environment to take action?”"
Putin Nukes Trump – Again
By Mark B. Schneider, RealClearDefense: "The Thunder-2019 strategic nuclear exercise was reportedly the largest of its class. The announced duration was three days rather than the usual one. It continued the trend toward an increased number of live nuclear missile launches. This was the first large nuclear exercise in which there were intermediate-range Kalibr cruise missiles and 9M729 nuclear-capable cruise missile launches. Neither the U.S. nor any NATO state has counterparts for these weapons, so there is little likelihood they were being used in response to the U.S. or NATO first use. Even if we had comparable weapons, the probability we would use them in a conventional war would be close to zero."
Focusing on Quality Over Quantity in the U.S. Military Budget
By Michael E. O'Hanlon & James N. Miller, Brookings: "While it is true that U.S. military spending far exceeds all other nations, including rivals China and Russia, James Miller and Michael O'Hanlon note that defense spending is lower as a percent of GDP than it was during much of the Cold War and in the late 2000s."
Rethinking the Amphibious Task Force:
Digital Interoperability and the Transformation of USMC Aviation
By Robbin Laird, SLD.info: “With the transformation of Marine Corps Aviation, the older notion of the ARG-MEU is being replaced by a much more flexible concept of the amphibious task force."
Moor-pedo: A Strategic Weapon to Re-shape Naval Conflict
By Brian Dulla, USNI Blog: “Nearly every mine warfare article or presentation starts off with the same sentence: “Naval mines have sunk or damaged more ships since the end of World War II than all other weapons combined.” This rhetoric, while true, has done nothing to sustain a U.S. strategic mining capability."
The U.S. Army’s Worst Tradition: Never Ready for the Next War
By James A. Warren, The Daily Beast: "While the U.S. Army was bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, China and Russia were dexterously outflanking American military capabilities."
Russia's Return To The Middle East
by Jakub Grygiel via The Caravan
The reinsertion of Russia into the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is one of the big stories of the past decade. Although Russia’s recueillement after 1991 resulted in its effective disappearance from the Middle East, her presence in the region is of course not a new reality in history. Tsars and Soviet leaders pushed their military might and political influence into the region for the last three centuries, clashing with various great powers, from the Ottoman sultanate to the British empire and the United States. But the speed at which the current Russian advance has occurred is surprising and troubling. Moscow has inserted an enormous level of instability and unpredictability to the already murky local power dynamics.
What Happens When Tactics Take Primacy over Strategy?
By Robert Cassidy, Modern War Instiute: "In most of the wars since World War II, American senior civilian and military leaders have exhibited an aptitude for tactics and an inaptitude for strategy. Both strategy and war are hard. But war without strategy is violence without reason."
The Middle East In An Era Of Great Power Competition
by A. Wess Mitchell via The Caravan
In 1920, a young Winston Churchill wrote a memorandum to the Cabinet outlining his concerns about British policy in the Middle East. Britain was, he wrote, “simultaneously out of sympathy with all the four powers exercising local influence.” The Arabs, erstwhile allies in the war, were already unhappy with the emerging postwar settlement. The defeated Turks, Britain’s traditional regional ally, were resentful and looking for new partners. The Russians, under new Bolshevik leadership, were skillfully courting Turkey and Persia. And the Greeks wanted greater British backing against Turkey.
New Terrorism in the Wake of Withdrawal
By Faith Stewart, RealClearDefense: "The last three American presidential elections have emphasized a commitment to “bringing troops home” and bringing an end to “endless wars.” While the sentiment is well intentioned, it is at best misinformed and at worst intellectually dishonest."
So Long As Iran Dominates the Middle East, a New Baghdadi Will Rise
By Tzvi Kahn, The Hill: "Iran’s efforts to achieve hegemony in the Middle East have entailed the brutal suppression of Sunni Arab populations. In Syria, the relentless atrocities of the Assad regime reflected those of ISIS itself. In Iraq, a pro-Tehran government marginalized Sunni Arabs and persecuted their leaders."
Is Russia the Middle East’s New Hegemon?
By Shlomo Ben-Ami, The Strategist (ASPI): “Brain wave-reading threat detectors can dramatically increase a soldier’s ability to spot danger.”
Moscow Showcases Breakthrough in Automated Command and Control
By Roger McDermott, Eurasia Daily Monitor: "The importance of this development cannot be underestimated, as it places the Russian military decision-making process and automated C2 beyond the existing capabilities of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) militaries."
Avoiding the Charge of the Light Brigade Against China
By Mike Pietrucha, War on the Rocks: “The Charge of the Light Brigade” provides a classic example of the subordination of military skill in favor of courage and stubbornness, seasoned with a generous measure of poor leadership and a dash of sheer chaos."
Russia’s Black Sea Dominance Strategy—A Blend of Military and Civilian Assets
By Yuri Lapaiev, Eurasia Daily Monitor: "Besides improving its naval power, the Kremlin has tested various other means of exerting pressure in the Black Sea. One of these methods has been the periodic blocking of expansive maritime areas for allegedly military exercises."
The Great Game in the South Pacific
By Graeme Dunk, The Strategist (ASPI): "The Great Game was played by Great Britain and Russia throughout the 19th century and reflected the two powers’ political and strategic jostling for influence across Central Asia. It was essentially about geographic positioning, and a 21st-century version is now being played in the South Pacific."
AI and Quantum Supremacy Will Not Defeat Revolutionary Warfare
By Nathaniel L. Moir, RealClearDefense: "Undeniably, technological innovations have shaped warfare throughout history as they will in the future. However, as we cannot rely only on tactical and operational skill ..."
Today, military analysts are struggling to understand how the digital era’s new technology will transform warfare. In a new AEI report, Kenneth Pollack claims that it is dangerous to assume that the US will succeed in future conflicts simply because it is leading the information revolution. And it is equally dangerous to assume that future warfighting will coordinate with American military practices. The key to understanding how militaries will perform is less about the new technology they will acquire and more about how societal factors will shape militaries and their approaches to that technology. Read the full report here.
Talk to any Pentagon official these days and they'll raise two big issues: the peak in defense spending and the threat that China poses to our American way of life. In a new Defense One op-ed, Mackenzie Eaglen explains that while defense spending has been advertised for years, there is grave concern for a government-wide spending freeze. Defense leaders are struggling to make the case on China to the American people dwelling far beyond the swamp. Whether it be China's influence in Hollywood or its efforts to censor free speech on Twitter, policymakers must make their case to the American people in ways that the people both understand and see happening in their daily lives. Read it here.
The Importance of the Tactical Level: The Arab-Israeli War of 1973
By Lorris Beverelli, Strategy Bridge: “Each level of war is essential to achieve success, and are all equally important. The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 provides an illustration of why the tactical level is essential."
Rethinking Bernard Fall’s Legacy.
The Persistent Relevance of Revolutionary Warfare
By Octavian Manea, Small Wars Journal: "It should be no surprise for readers to recognize that when it came to his analysis of war in Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, Fall already had a detailed and profound grasp of the Hague and Geneva Conventions and, more broadly, laws governing warfare."
HOW THE MARINE CORPS TALKS LEADERSHIP, ARMY LEARNS ABOUT MOBILE NUKES & KEY PILLARS OF RUSSIAN STRATEGY
The Four Letters: A Leadership Parable
By Jason Lamb, War on the Rocks: "A recently fired commander wasn't bitter about what had happened, and so decided to offer some help to his replacement. He told the incoming commander, “I left you with four sealed letters. When you're faced with a crisis you can't handle, open the first envelope."
Mobile Nuclear Power Will Enable Army Logistics Revolution
By Dan Christman, War On The Rocks: “The Army needs more and better batteries. But to meet the higher energy needs of the next generation of weapons systems, the Army needs a generator that can dramatically increase the amount of tactical energy. Only nuclear power can provide the energy density necessary to have both a small footprint and a low logistical tail. It is not an exaggeration to say that the deployment of mobile, micro nuclear power plants would revolutionize military logistics for the 21st century.”
How Afghanistan Prepared NATO for Great-Power Competition
By Iain King, Modern War Institute: “Great-power competition is certainly back, but it would be a mistake to regard NATO's enduring operation in Afghanistan as a distraction or a detour—or worse, as a factor that has made great-power competition more likely. Rather, the long war in that country has prepared the West for today's challenges. NATO is now far more able to face down Russia and China precisely because of the tough lessons and battlefield adaptations forced upon it by the long and difficult experience in Afghanistan.”
In his view, managers are concerned with the bottom line and making a profit, while leaders are concerned with their followers, their health, their happiness, and their daily lives. Recognition of the sources of leaders is addressed and followed with a discussion of the principles of leadership and the historical traits of a leader. The book covers the essential elements of leadership: care, personality, knowledge, motivation, commitment, and communication with a chapter on each element.
4 Reasons Why Fuel Threatens Our Lethality
By Robert Guerrero, Defense News: "This is a question that keeps me up at night. Are we prepared to defend the homeland and defeat our enemies at any location around the world? If faced against a near-peer or peer competitor, will we have the necessary infrastructure and logistical supply chain to support the lethality we need on the battlefield?"
The Moscow School of Hard Knocks: Key Pillars of Russian Strategy by Michael Kofma
3 ways America can fix its vulnerability to cruise missiles
Bradley Bowman and Andrew Gabel – Defense News
A Century Of Ideas: Hoover's One Hundred Years Of War, Revolution, And Peace
via The Hoover Centennial
Historians Niall Ferguson and Victor Davis Hanson will discuss the seminal events of the last century—the two World Wars, the Great Depression, the rise and fall of Soviet communism, and the advent of modernism and globalization—and how Hoover Institution scholars, informed by the lessons of history, have interpreted these tragedies and challenges.
The Rise of the Present Unconventional Character of Warfare
By Mike Fowler, Strategy Bridge: "Unconventional war wears down the opponent over time by requiring them to use a disproportionate amount of resources creating the perception of “the improbability of victory or the unacceptable cost” of continuing operations."
Assessing Black Swans and their Pre-Incident Indicators
By Charles Cameron, Divergent Options: "Black Swan Events come as a surprise, have a major effect, and are often inappropriately rationalized after the fact with the benefit of hindsight."
The Lost Promise of 1989
By Mark Leonard, The Strategist (ASPI): "After the collapse of communism in Europe in 1989, many dreamed of building a united and free continent with the European Union at its core. But 30 years later, Europeans have awoken to a new reality."
The Importance of the Operational Level:
The Ludendorff Offensives of 1918
By Lorris Beverelli, Strategy Bridge: "Each level of war is essential to achieve success, and are all equally important. The Ludendorff Offensives of 1918 provide an illustration of why the operational level is essential."
By Nathaniel Moir, War Room: "The idea that going native entails the violent pathology of the Kurtz’s stands in stark contrast with René Riesen’s efforts to support the Bahnar Tribe during the First Indochina War."
Partnerships Are at the Core of Modern Deterrence
By Giedrimas Jeglinskas, RUSI: "How does a state achieve effective deterrence? Lithuania provides an example"
Make China Great Again: Xi’s Truly Grand Strategy by Andrew Erickson
U.S. Military Readiness ‘Marginal’
By Mike Glenn, The Washington Times: "In their “2020 Index of U.S. Military Strength,” Heritage Foundation analysts rate each of the armed services as only “marginal.” They also paint a chilling picture about the rapid military modernization of Russia and China."
The U.S. Army Will Experience Battlefield Surprise--
Here’s How to Prepare Leaders and Organizations to Overcome It
By Jim Greer, Modern War Institute: "On October 6, 1973 the Israel Defense Forces were surprised when the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces commenced what would become known to Israelis as the Yom Kippur War and to Arabs as the October War. The true surprise, though, was not when and how the war commenced."
Success Requires Self Direction
By Albert H. Konetzni Jr., Proceedings: "To continuously improve, organizations and individuals need a game plan."
Global Risks 2035 Update: Decline or New Renaissance?
By Mathew J. Burrows, Atlantic Council: "We must recognize that the old historical rhythm that laid the foundations of the Western liberal order has come to an end."
U.S. Deterrence in the Middle East Is Collapsing
By John Hannah, Foreign Policy: “The withdrawal from Syria is part of a broader pattern of weakness, especially in response to Iran."