“Navigating Gulf Waters After the Iran Nuclear Deal” (Melissa Dalton, Center for Strategic and International Studies)
“The dialogue that fostered the JCPOA now provides potential for U.S.-Iranian communication on other U.S. policy priorities. High-level U.S. officials may now pick up the phone and make routine calls to their Iranian counterparts -- an option unavailable only a few years ago. This new phase of dialogue brings new opportunities, but it also poses risks that the United States must manage carefully. For more than three decades, Iran has relied on its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to secure its interests in the Gulf by using a combination of proxies and asymmetric capabilities in neighboring states and regions with majority Shi’ite populations to promote its interests and marginalize political forces that could undermine its foreign policy agenda. This agenda -- an amalgam of geopolitical and sectarian interests -- has become more significant in light of the intensifying rivalry with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Iranian-Saudi friction across the region, particularly in the Gulf, will not only continue to shape Gulf security, but will pose new challenges for U.S. policy in the region in the post-JCPOA period.”
“Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State” (Peter Salisbury, Chatham House)
“In the case of Yemen, the groups taking part in the civil war are routinely oversimplified into ‘pro-Hadi’ and ‘pro-Houthi’ camps. The reality is that most Yemenis do not support either the president or the northern rebels; rather, they are part of much smaller groups with their own identity, ideology, grievances and political goals, from secessionists in the south to Salafists in Taiz and Aden and tribal leaders in the north. Maintaining the illusion that either Hadi or the Houthi–Saleh alliance is representative of, or has control over these groups would be a dangerous folly. There is a growing consensus among Yemen analysts and researchers that the transitional process of 2012–14 failed because of exactly such a gap in policy-makers’ understanding of Yemen, and because of the mismatch between the needs of the Yemeni people and the priorities of the transition’s foreign sponsors. Along with the Yemeni elites, the UN and the member states of the UN Security Council focused on political power-balancing at the elite level, reinforcing the power of these elites while ignoring local dynamics and historically marginalized groups such as the Houthis and southern separatists, and paying little more than lip service to addressing the collapse in services and standards of living.”
“The dialogue that fostered the JCPOA now provides potential for U.S.-Iranian communication on other U.S. policy priorities. High-level U.S. officials may now pick up the phone and make routine calls to their Iranian counterparts -- an option unavailable only a few years ago. This new phase of dialogue brings new opportunities, but it also poses risks that the United States must manage carefully. For more than three decades, Iran has relied on its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to secure its interests in the Gulf by using a combination of proxies and asymmetric capabilities in neighboring states and regions with majority Shi’ite populations to promote its interests and marginalize political forces that could undermine its foreign policy agenda. This agenda -- an amalgam of geopolitical and sectarian interests -- has become more significant in light of the intensifying rivalry with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Iranian-Saudi friction across the region, particularly in the Gulf, will not only continue to shape Gulf security, but will pose new challenges for U.S. policy in the region in the post-JCPOA period.”
“Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State” (Peter Salisbury, Chatham House)
“In the case of Yemen, the groups taking part in the civil war are routinely oversimplified into ‘pro-Hadi’ and ‘pro-Houthi’ camps. The reality is that most Yemenis do not support either the president or the northern rebels; rather, they are part of much smaller groups with their own identity, ideology, grievances and political goals, from secessionists in the south to Salafists in Taiz and Aden and tribal leaders in the north. Maintaining the illusion that either Hadi or the Houthi–Saleh alliance is representative of, or has control over these groups would be a dangerous folly. There is a growing consensus among Yemen analysts and researchers that the transitional process of 2012–14 failed because of exactly such a gap in policy-makers’ understanding of Yemen, and because of the mismatch between the needs of the Yemeni people and the priorities of the transition’s foreign sponsors. Along with the Yemeni elites, the UN and the member states of the UN Security Council focused on political power-balancing at the elite level, reinforcing the power of these elites while ignoring local dynamics and historically marginalized groups such as the Houthis and southern separatists, and paying little more than lip service to addressing the collapse in services and standards of living.”
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