Fragility and Failure: A Better Foreign Policy to Counter New Threats

By Katherine Zimmerman

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Key Points

- The US can no longer afford to prioritize counterterrorism at the cost of competing with global powers such as China and Russia.
- Instead, the US must transform its approach to countering al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other like-minded groups by focusing on the environment that enables both Salafi-jihadis and adversaries such as China and Russia to expand their influence.
- Transforming the approach requires the US to improve how it operates in complex and fragile environments. The Global Fragility Act (GFA) is an opportunity to drive the necessary change throughout the interagency to succeed in these spaces. But its implementation has fallen short.
- Senior administration officials should use the GFA to develop and implement a strategic-level approach that underscores conflict prevention, stabilization, and peace building. This means using foreign assistance effectively to advance American interests and contest territory that will otherwise fall to Salafi-jihadis or to Beijing or Moscow.

The US is no closer today to defeating al Qaeda and like-minded groups than it was on 9/11. The American home front may be safe for now and better defended against known threats due in no small part to the vigilance of US intelligence, military, and law enforcement personnel. But the Salafi-jihadi enemy has strengthened globally and adapts and innovates to achieve its aims.

As they have done before, Salafi-jihadi groups that have been defeated or near defeat can reconstitute or build the conditions to do so, creating a risk that the resources expended against them will have been wasted. The Islamic State’s rise in Iraq erased hard-won US and Iraqi gains. Al Qaeda in Yemen recovered from setbacks after Emirati counterterrorism operations in 2018. And the Taliban and al Qaeda are set to come back in Afghanistan, where the Trump administration negotiated the withdrawal of US troops based on the assumption that the Taliban breaks a multi-decade relationship with al Qaeda. In the Sahel and Somalia, trends strongly favor Salafi-jihadis. Any perceived successes against these groups will probably be lost because counterterrorism alone will not deliver a lasting victory.

The US is in a period of rebalancing its resources against strategic priorities. For nearly two decades, the US has resourced counterterrorism operations at the expense of other interests, assuming risks in conventional military readiness and other areas.
Addressing the rising competition from other global powers—China and Russia, namely—to protect American interests and influence abroad will reshape the US military and diplomatic posture globally.

Reducing the US government’s counterterrorism bloat will better enable the US to advance its varied strategic interests and is necessary, especially in light of global power competition and in responding to the effects of the coronavirus pandemic. Yet, it should also call into question whether the US is prepared to carry the cost of counterterrorism—particularly against such transnational Salafi-jihadi groups as al Qaeda and the Islamic State—indeﬁnitely as they persist despite signiﬁcant US pressure against them. Transforming the approach to combat these groups could aid in securing American interests against Chinese or Russian encroachments while permanently defeating the Salafi-jihadi threat.

Recent initiatives in the US government should inform components of the new approach. Over the past few years, the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (State), and US Agency for International Development (USAID) have sought to reform how they engage in fragile and complex environments—where Salafi-jihadi groups also frequently operate—to take a more evidence-based and better-coordinated approach.

These initiatives include the Stabilization Assistance Review, the Strategic Prevention Project, and support of the United States Institute of Peace’s congressionally mandated Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States. Congress codiﬁed and expanded some of the recommendations generated by these initiatives into the Global Fragility Act (GFA), which passed into law in December 2019. Successful implementation of the GFA will improve America’s ability to advance its interests in complex environments as it counters the advance of the Salafi-jihadi movement and other competitors.

Ending the “Endless War”

The US counterterrorism strategy will not defeat the Salafi-jihadi groups that endeavor to attack the homeland or American interests. Instead, it seeks to defeat the terror threat from them to keep Americans safe and, over time, weaken the groups so they will never again threaten the US. The US government has thus put its resources against identifying and degrading the terror networks and disrupting their operations, combining kinetic military actions with other traditional counterterrorism tools such as counterthreat finance and counterradicalization programs.

At the strategy’s heart is the assumption that the US and its partners can attrite the membership of Salafi-jihadi organizations faster than they are able to replace their members and that advances in US defenses and intelligence capabilities will protect American interests from any attack. While such actions have certainly weakened groups, reduced their terror attack capabilities signiﬁcantly, and prevented another mass-casualty attack on American soil, they have not eliminated the threat from Salafi-jihadi groups. The current approach, in which hard power dominates, has yielded short-term successes but little more.

The cookie-cutter interventions—focused on degrading networks and disrupting operations through targeted killings and raids—preserve or at times worsen the local conditions that enabled the initial rise of Salafi-jihadis. Yet those very conditions offer Salafi-jihadi groups the opportunity to reconstitute and strengthen. Salafi-jihadis insinuate themselves into local Sunni communities by conducting outreach along nonideological lines to build support. They then can gather resources and develop expertise that later combine to threaten US or partners’ interests.

Strategic thinkers working the problem in the US government understand these dynamics but have no mandate to operate outside a limited range of counterterrorism activities. Deﬁning the Salafi-jihadi problem as a counterterrorism one has hindered the development of a comprehensive strategy and guaranteed continued reliance on hard power to combat the threat.

The most signiﬁcant shift as the US realigns resources toward global power competition is occurring in DOD. DOD, and especially the special operations forces (SOF) community that has led US counterterrorism campaigns, faces hard questions about prioritization and risk. Countering Chinese, Russian, and other competitors’ expanding inﬂuence will draw on many of the very same intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) assets currently supporting US counterterrorism operations. Whether the counterterrorism approach will remain viable with reduced resources—effectiveness aside—is now in question.

The US has defined down its counterterrorism requirements, shifting campaign objectives against Salafi-jihadi organizations to lesser thresholds, and has become more reliant on partners to counter the Salafi-jihadi expansion. Lifting counterterrorism pressure from al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other such groups only increases the likelihood they will absorb any losses and reconstitute—stronger in many cases. Salafi-jihadis’ intent to attack Americans continues unabated, and they will test the defenses of America’s homeland security infrastructure. These groups also benefit in part from the actions of maligned actors like China and Russia as part of a “vicious cycle” that threatens US interests.

The US must therefore reframe its approach against the Salafi-jihadi movement to go beyond counterterrorism. This approach must aim to isolate Salafi-jihadis from populations by targeting the Salafi-jihadi’s ability to develop local relationships within communities rather than prioritizing targeting individuals and groups to dismantle terror networks. The effort is therefore to identify those specific locations at risk of or experiencing Salafi-jihadi penetration and use a combination of soft and hard power to change the local conditions to reduce the influence of Salafi-jihadi groups.

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Instead of acting directly against Salafi-jihadi groups to weaken them, the US will ensure the full spectrum of its activities orients on changing the local conditions and restoring resilience to communities that have fallen prey to Salafi-jihadi incursions. This approach is not nation building; the US and partners must focus their efforts on specific terrain. State should lead the interagency in designing and coordinating bespoke soft-power interventions supported by the US military to counter Salafi-jihadi groups for each theater.

Reorienting the US approach against Salafi-jihadis to focus primarily on severing their ties to communities rather than defeating them militarily opens opportunities for the US to advance other interests simultaneously. Soft-power interventions, properly sequenced and phased, could also strengthen US influence or counter the influence of actors like China and Russia.

Engaging central governments and substate actors to bolster and improve liberal and representative governance in states where Salafi-jihadis are active both blocks a primary vector by which the groups gain entry into communities and counters some of the autocratic tendencies that disruptive states tend to foster. Such a strategy will require a substantial planning investment upfront and budgeting for revamped foreign assistance programming. But a strategy that finally places kinetic operations in a supporting rather than lead role should reduce the long-term resource drain by counterterrorism operations and limit the expansion of Chinese, Russian, and others’ influence.

The GFA: An Opportunity

The authorities and capabilities to execute such a strategy exist within the US government, but legacy mindsets and structural bureaucratic hurdles make it nearly impossible to implement without senior-level endorsement and attention. Nearly 20 years of building, improving, and refining the counterterrorism tool set against Salafi-jihadi groups and cultivating local partnerships to combat them on the ground has entrenched the bureaucracy in the current approach.

Muscle memory in the US government now reflexively turns to the same tried-and-true strategy when new groups threaten, defeating the immediate terror threat to the US but not preventing the global strengthening of the Salafi-jihadi movement. Aversion to risk, a trait of all bureaucracies, constrains the ability of the US to act in insecure or complex environments by restricting personnel from operating in these environments and eliminating incentives to try new approaches that might fail. Most importantly, no single person or office in the US
government is responsible for coordinating the efforts against Salafi-jihadi groups, resulting in a disjointed and largely tactical effort across the interagency, sometimes directly at odds with other US lines of efforts in a country or region.

The GFA is a bipartisan effort to transform how the US government approaches fragile environments and fix some of the underlying structural issues. It intends to align US priorities across the government in a single strategy to address fragility and the conditions that provide opportunities to Salafi-jihadi groups and revisionist actors. The GFA requires State to lead the relevant departments and agencies in drafting a 10-year global strategy to address fragility (the Global Fragility Strategy). It then requires 10-year plans for at least five fragile countries or regions—prioritized by US national security interests, levels of fragility, and commitment and capability of local governments as partners—to guide US policy.

The GFA also authorizes and appropriates for two funds: the Prevention and Stabilization Fund (§200,000,000 for each fiscal year 2020–24) and the Complex Crisis Fund (§30,000,000 for each fiscal year 2020–24). These funds give State and USAID more flexibility in their foreign assistance programming. The GFA authorized a third fund, the Multi-Donor Global Fragility Fund, to enable donor coordination. The GFA’s intent is to drive a mindset change in the US government bureaucracies that will align US government activities across departments and agencies to make US foreign assistance and diplomatic engagements more effective at advancing US interests.

The change the GFA seeks to drive in the US government is necessary to transform the US approach to countering the Salafi-jihadi movement. Fundamentally, the GFA seeks to align all US activities—diplomatic, economic, information, military, and political—under a single strategic approach and plan for each country or region. It tasks the president and the administration with developing such a strategy and the plans to align “all relevant diplomatic, development, and security assistance and activities” under the strategy.

Clear prioritization of what the US seeks to achieve in each theater should prevent regularly subordinating medium- and long-term efforts to short-term counterterrorism actions. It will also provide the guiding principles so all aspects of US influence—from key leader engagements to development assistance and security partnerships—build toward common objectives and reinforce each other rather than counteract one another, as sometimes occurs today.

Solving fragility—if even possible in the short term—is certainly not the solution to the Salafi-jihadi problem. Fragility does not create extremism. However, the link between fragility and extremism has been well-documented as fragility sets conditions that favor extremist groups and particularly Salafi-jihadi groups. Frailty reduces the resiliency of local communities, making them vulnerable to Salafi-jihadi outreach. Salafi-jihadi groups seize opportunities to expand on the ground that a strategy to reduce fragility would address: illegitimate governments, weak governance, and armed non-state actors. They build local relationships and grow their influence by delivering basic public goods—justice, security, and services—that communities lack.

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Still, the GFA provides a golden opportunity to integrate and test a new approach to countering Salafi-jihadi groups. Local contexts are incredibly important to Salafi-jihadi groups, and changing those contexts to close out opportunities for Salafi-jihadis to assert influence will do more to weaken the groups permanently than simply killing members. The new global fragility strategy will focus US efforts on those local contexts and must specify ways to reduce vulnerabilities in communities against efforts by Salafi-jihadi groups to infiltrate them. Returning resilience to Sunni communities can break the ties between communities and Salafi-jihadis as the communities regain independence.

The multiyear implementation plan for the strategy will require thoughtful sequencing and phasing of foreign assistance programs and other engagements to improve conditions, which should
then inform and at times constrain the US military’s actions against local Salafi-jihadi individuals and groups.

**Predictable Pitfalls in Implementation**

The window of opportunity the GFA opens to improve the US approach to working in fragile states and test a new way to counter the Salafi-jihadi movement could close. Implementing the GFA has hit predictable pitfalls as congressionally mandated requirements run into competing priorities and friction in the bureaucracies of the various departments and agencies. The coronavirus pandemic introduced early, ongoing challenges for interagency coordination. It added to the lift required to implement GFA requirements by affecting long-term planning forecasts and created the risk that responding to the increasing fragility driven by the pandemic subsumes the GFA’s broader goals.

The administration outlined the draft fragility strategy’s key goals and way forward in a recent report to Congress. But the stated progress reveals crucial shortcomings. The administration is moving forward by checking the boxes, but the process is not producing desired changes in the bureaucratic mindset and how the US government operates.

A key obstacle to the successful implementation of the GFA is the level of support and attention it has at the most senior levels of the US government.

The law has bipartisan support and is the product of a series of initiatives, including the Stabilization Assistance Review and the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States. Yet its language does not resonate outside of a niche community because of the stabilization, violence-reduction, and conflict-prevention framing. The focus of many of the GFA’s advocates, including nongovernmental organizations and other stakeholders, remains on issues related to their work on conflict prevention and peace building and how to operationalize a plan—ensuring stakeholder buy-in and partnerships, determining metrics to evaluate success, and improving US stabilization activities.

These are important aspects that deserve attention, but they do not broach the broader range of national security interests beyond addressing fragility that a strategic-level approach to working in fragile spaces could advance. Moreover, many of the GFA’s champions discuss the means to secure US interests—conflict prevention, stabilization, and other such tools—as the ends themselves. Preventing and reversing destabilization through these tools will improve America’s ability to counter the influence of malign and transnational actors in fragile states, including Salafi-jihadi groups and China, Russia, and Iran, directly complementing top US national security priorities.

To date, implementation of the GFA remains limited to those offices tasked with stabilization issues, reinforcing some of the very silos that the law seeks to break down. Regular demands on personnel’s time, made more difficult by remote work during the coronavirus pandemic, contribute to the silos. So, too, does the notion that the GFA reforms will only touch certain offices because of the GFA’s focus on fragility and stabilization.

At State, the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and the Office of Foreign Assistance (F) own the GFA process. CSO and F are not the only bureaus or offices with vested interests, however. The Bureau of Counterterrorism has not actively contributed to this initiative despite the relationship between local conditions and the spread of extremism. The regional bureaus and other functional bureaus should each be involved in shaping the fragility strategy and drafting the implementation plans.

Similarly, at DOD, implications for how a new strategic approach would shift engagements extend beyond the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs to include geographic combatant commands and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. The same is also true for USAID. The GFA will not succeed in aligning a single set of priorities across the US government without broader support from within the bureaucracy and contributions to this implementation process.
A key obstacle to the successful implementation of the GFA is the level of support and attention it has at the most senior levels of the US government. Senior officials pay lip service to the GFA and its potential to improve America’s effectiveness in fragile states but have not made it a priority for their direct subordinates. State, DOD, and USAID have reinforced siloing the initiative in specific bureaus and offices by following the letter of the law, which calls for an official at the rank of assistant secretary or assistant administrator or above at State, DOD, and USAID to oversee the global fragility strategy.

The department and agency leads on the GFA implementation have little ability to cajole their peers into contributing to the global fragility strategy without cover from higher up, especially when undersecretaries’ attention is on other initiatives. Senior officials must convey to their subordinates how the GFA can be a vehicle to transform America’s soft-power approaches into an effective capability to advance multiple US interests.

The tyranny of the “now” persists without clear incentives in the GFA to shift focus. Offices received their regular planning budgets for this year, creating tension between spending current funds and dedicating resources to plan for theoretical funds. Congress structured the GFA so the administration must produce a strategy and implementation plan before receiving additional funding—a smart check to prevent simply throwing more money at a problem. That implementation plan must not be a rebranding of existing foreign assistance programs as supporting the fragility strategy, avoiding the easy trap of what happened to countering violent extremism (CVE) when programs were simply rebranded under CVE when they had little direct impact on the radicalization process. Without external pressure, the bureaucracy will adjust how it frames what it is doing and continue to grind on past potential change.

**What to Do: Policy Recommendations**

Getting the GFA’s implementation right means being able to compete with China, Russia, and Salafi-jihadi groups where the US is currently losing. The global fragility strategy should bring about change that is more transformational than just incorporating and expanding on the ongoing efforts in the US government to address the challenges of fragility, conflict, and extremism. The GFA removes budgeting and planning obstacles that State and USAID commonly cite by establishing multiyear and more flexible funding streams.

It is also a real opportunity to examine how the US federal government has organized and prioritized over the years to identify areas to reform. If done well, the transformations driven by the GFA will enhance America’s ability to secure its national security interests in a wide range of countries over the medium and long term while ensuring efficient and effective foreign assistance programming. The GFA’s language is about fragility, but its implications reach further. Congress and the US administration will need to apply pressure on the US government bureaucracy to take advantage of this opportunity.

Congressional oversight is essential to prevent the US government from implementing the requirements but not the intent of the GFA. Two key mechanisms exist: oversight hearings to call offices to task on progress and budget appropriations to incentivize action. A public hearing provides a forum for Congress to review the draft strategy and pressure US government stakeholders to speak beyond their talking points on the GFA and ensure the GFA remains on the schedule of principles. The right to call such hearings is reserved in the GFA’s statutory text as the committees decide.

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Congress could also use fiscal year 2021 funding as leverage over various bureaus and offices to support the GFA’s implementation. Directly tying the appropriations of funds in specific countries or regions to the development of a country or regional plan—and refusing to fund other programs outside
this plan—will compel the bureaucracy to action. Demanding new rather than relabeled foreign assistance programs as part of the plan prevents the surface-level retooling of programs that occurred during the shift to CVE.16

Reforming America’s strategic approach to conflict prevention and stabilization sharpens a tool in the US foreign policy tool kit that helps prevent the types of state collapse that lead to threats against US interests. China and Russia exploit vulnerabilities in weak states and low-intensity conflicts to expand their influence. Salafi-jihadi groups similarly prey on marginalized communities weakened by local conflicts or governance gaps. The administration should capitalize on the moment of change to recalibrate the US approach to the Salafi-jihadi problem away from just counterterrorism and then rightsize the resources toward counterterrorism activities.99

As part of the GFA, State should ensure the global fragility strategy addresses the interlocking objectives between stabilization, countering Salafi-jihadis (and other extremists), and competing with China and Russia.20 Identifying clear objectives and tying US foreign assistance programs to achieving specific outcomes will help reduce spending waste and legacy programs that have not yielded intended national security benefits for the US.

Senior officials in the administration and across State, USAID, and DOD should actively support the GFA and its initiative to reform US foreign assistance and resource commitments in fragile environments. They need to drive the interagency’s understanding of the GFA’s broad reforms to the strategic-level approach that will also support higher US national security priorities like global competition and counterterrorism. The administration should use the coordinating authorities of the National Security Council to integrate and adopt the country and regional implementation plans for the global fragility strategy into its strategies.

Those country strategies—also incorporating competition and counterterrorism—should then be the single document from which members of the interagency plan their efforts, including the regional bureaus at State and the geographic combatant commands at DOD. Aligning priorities across the federal government will also improve the ability of the US to coordinate with partners so they can plug in more effectively to US efforts. State should ensure that the authorized Multi-Donor Global Fragility Fund facilitates such burden-sharing with partners.

**Call to Action**

The US is losing against Salafi-jihadi groups and will lose against Chinese and Russian advances in fragile and complex environments. Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and like-minded groups intentionally stoke conflict and harness the ensuing instability to expand on the ground, filling the governance gaps and mobilizing in defense of local Sunni populations against real or perceived threats. Counterterrorism pressure can be effective in weakening these groups but must be sustained to prevent a group’s reconstitution until underlying conditions are addressed.

The US cannot afford to prioritize its military resources against this problem indefinitely at the cost of protecting its interests globally from Chinese and Russian incursions. Moreover, the tactics that the Chinese Communist Party and the Kremlin use exacerbate instability in weak states, including those already coping with a Salafi-jihadi challenge.21 Russian actors have also intervened in these states under the cloak of counterterrorism to establish military positions and expand Russian influence.22 Insecurity limits the reach of US soft power in these states, and the threat level does not merit significant use of hard power. US adversaries’ influence expands in places of state collapse while American influence—and the US ability to secure its own interests—contracts.

The US needs to reframe its approach to the Salafi-jihadi threat to end the seemingly “endless war” it has been waging against groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State while incorporating ways to protect American interests from initiatives spearheaded by Beijing or Moscow. Fixing the US approach to stabilizing and reducing conflict in fragile states directly improves America’s ability to compete against these malign and transnational actors. The GFA aims to do just this.

Conflict prevention, stabilization, and peace building are the means to advance and secure American interests in fragile and conflict-ridden states without deploying the US military to far-
flung corners of the world. Improving and optimizing how the US engages in these activities minimizes the resources devoted to solving these problems abroad without compromising American influence. Reversing negative trends or even staving off collapse better positions the US to act and reduces opportunities for American competitors to gain.

Fragility and violence are only likely to increase in the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic, especially in states where competitors have already threatened US interests. The administration and senior officials at State, DOD, and USAID should embrace the transformation the GFA seeks to start in how the US engages in fragile spaces. Implementing the GFA to the letter of the law will yield marginal gains. Using it as a vehicle to drive change in the bureaucratic mindset of how to approach the nexus of competition, counterterrorism, and stabilization could be much more game-changing for the US.

About the Author

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Notes


6. For example, DOD has shifted its objectives against the Salafi-jihadi network in the Sahel in West Africa from “degrade” (to reduce the effectiveness or efficiency) to “contain” (to stop, hold, or surround enemy forces or to cause the enemy to center activity on a given front and to prevent the withdrawal of enemy forces for use elsewhere). The US military supports French and regional military operations in the Sahel. According to a report from DOD’s Office of the Inspector General, the network has not been contained. US Defense Department, Office of Inspector General, “Lead Inspector General for East Africa and North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operations Quarterly Report to the United States Congress October 1, 2019, through December 31, 2019,” February 11, 2020, https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/2080495/lead-inspector-general-for-east-africa-and-north-and-west-africa-counterterrorism/.


11. The Prevention and Stabilization Fund replaces the Relief and Recovery Fund, which earmarked $200,000,000 for assistance to areas under the control of, liberated from, or at risk from the Islamic State or other violent extremist organizations.


16. These include the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

17. Anecdotes provided to the author during conversations on CVE and foreign assistance programs by individuals working on CVE speak to efforts to rebrand or connect programs with CVE. A 2019 audit of State Department CVE policies and their implementation revealed that not all foreign assistance programs labeled as CVE supported the defined objectives related to CVE. The audit did not include information regarding the rebranding of programs. See US Department of State, Office of Inspector General, *Audit of the Department of State Implementation of Policies Intended to Counter Violent Extremism*, June 2019, https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/AUD-MERO-19-27.pdf.


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