The Taliban emerged in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar around September 1994.

The Taliban has retaken control of the district of Kohistan in the northwestern province of Faryab over the weekend. The district has changed hands twice during the past several months.

Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Muhajid claimed on Sept. 24 that the Kohistan district headquarters and “all CPs/buildings” fell to the Taliban and there were “multiple gunmen killed” and a “sizable amount [of] weapons seized” during the fighting.

Mujahid’s claim of control of Kohistan was confirmed by Afghan officials from the area. The district fell after “hundreds of militants staged attacks from different directions,” according to Pajhwok Afghan News. Afghan security forces fled the area during the Taliban onslaught. Security officials accused the Taliban of burning down the homes of civilians.

The Taliban previously overran Kohistan, which is also known as Lolash, at the end of July 2017 and held it briefly before Afghan commandos retook the district center. The Taliban remained on the outskirts of the district center.

Faryab province has been a Taliban hotbed over the past several years. Of the 15 districts, the Taliban currently control three (Kohistan, Pashtun Kot, and Ghormach), and contest six more (Almar, Dawlatabad, Khwaja Sabz Posh, Maimana, Qaysar, and Shirin Tagab). The Taliban has used these rural districts and others in neighboring provinces to pressure the provincial capital of Maimana. In the winter of 2016, the Taliban launched major attacks in an effort to cut off and overrun the city of Maimana.

The Taliban has remained on the offensive in all regions of Afghanistan, despite the fact that the US military has loosened the rules of engagement to target the Taliban and give more discretion to US commanders to launch air strikes and other kinetic operations. While the US military is deploying an additional 3,000 troops to Afghanistan, they will primarily serve as advisers to the Afghan military and police. Meanwhile, the Taliban has been able to launch attacks using hundreds of fighters during broad daylight with little fear of being targeted via the air.

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/09/taliban-retakes-district-in-afghan-northwest.php

Indiana Hoenlein and the Lost Skeletons of the Cave of the Skulls. @elalusa Report w/Malcolm Hoenlein @conf_of_pres. @thadmccotter

The fortress, believed to have been constructed around 120 BCE by its namesake, John Hyrcanus, was one of seven ordered built by King Herod to protect the eastern border of the Judean Kingdom from the Edomites and other enemies.

During the Byzantine period, a monastery was built on the ruins by monks, whose bodies were buried in the cave, which was only recently identified and has not been excavated.

Shattered skeletons, shovels, cigarette butts, coffee cups, and a net used to filter the dirt were found in the desecrated cave by members of Preserving the Eternal, a local consortium founded one year ago by volunteers who seek to protect such sites.

http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Tomb-raiders-vandalize-mysterious-Judean-Desert-skull-cave-505009

The quality of mercy in South Asia. Sadanand @dhume @gordongchang

In an interview last week in New York, Ms. Hasina, in town to address the U.N. General Assembly, explained why the Rohingya crisis has struck a chord with her and many of her compatriots. The prime minister finds parallels with her own nation’s blood-drenched birth in 1971, when then East Pakistan seceded to form Bangladesh.

“What the Pakistani military did with us, with our people, was the same thing.” In Ms. Hasina’s telling, this traumatic history—official Bangladeshi accounts say the Pakistani army and its allies killed three million people in their bid to prevent independence—places a responsibility on Bangladesh to help the persecuted. “We know what suffering means,” she says.

Though the Rohingya are Muslims, and Bangladesh is a Muslim-majority country, Ms. Hasina’s hospitality doesn’t come naturally. Her country holds about half as many people (163 million) as the U.S., in a flood-prone country roughly the size of Iowa. Though it has pulled itself out of extreme poverty—no longer the “basket case” Henry Kissinger dubbed it at birth—with a per capita income of $1,360, it’s not exactly wealthy either.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/bangladesh-shows-compassion-1506358442

HOOVER:  THE CARAVAN

THE CARAVAN ISSUE FALL 2017:  ISLAMISM IN MARITIME SOUTHEAST ASIA

Iraqi Kurds defy Baghdad with vote for independence Iraq’s Kurdistan autonomous region is voting today on a nonbinding independence referendum despite dire warnings from Baghdad and Iraq's neighbors. The final result should be announced within 72 hours and is expected to deliver an overwhelming “yes” vote. On Sunday, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi urged foreign countries to stop importing crude oil directly from the Kurdistan Region and to instead restrict oil trading to the Iraqi central government. 
   
Iran blocks Iraqi Kurdish flights ahead of independence vote Iran's Supreme National Security Council on Sunday announced that the country's airspace will be closed to flights to and from Iraqi Kurdistan as a result of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s decision to go ahead with its independence referendum. Tehran said the measure came at the request of Iraq’s central government. On Sunday evening, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani held a phone conversation with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan about the referendum, which Turkey also opposes.
   
Turkey steps up pressure on Iraqi Kurds after vote Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim announced today that Turkey will take action “without much delay” on a request from Iraq’s central government to follow in Iran’s footsteps and close air traffic to and from Iraqi Kurdistan. Yildirim said that Iraqi officers and military experts would join military exercises that the Turkish army launched last week along the border.
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Turkish authorities have already tightened control on entries from Iraqi Kurdistan through the Habur border crossing on account of the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) independence referendum, while Turkey’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement threatening sanctions. Turkey is also reportedly considering suspending oil exports from the area at the request of the Iraqi central government. The statement also raised the threat of military action following Saturday's vote by the Turkish parliament to extend a mandate allowing military operations in Iraq and Syria. The Foreign Ministry also issueda warning for Turkish citizens to avoid traveling to Iraqi Kurdistan.

PUTIN BOXED IN TO ASSIST KURDISH AMBITIONS
Russian President Vladimir Putin had been banking on Iraqi Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani. Over the past year, Russia has invested over $4 billion in the Kurdistan Region’s energy sector, overtaking the United States as the largest investor. By making such a commitment to northern Iraq, Putin was likely counting on both an eventual energy windfall and another card to play as a regional broker at the expense of the United States. He could count on good, or at least working, relationships with Damascus, Tehran, Ankara, to some extent Baghdad and, with the massive oil and gas venture, Erbil.

What the Russian president had not banked on was that Barzani would go ahead with the independence referendum on Sept. 25 against widespread international and regional opposition. The Kremlin, of course, could not support ethnic separatism, and was probably hoping for a last-minute deal with Baghdad to stave off the vote. As the prospects of a postponement collapsed, Barzani likely saw Russia’s investment as a hedge against the nearly unified international opposition to its referendum on independence.

Putin, of course, kept up appearances of being in control, but there was no denying the unusual nature of his visit to Ankara on Sept. 28 for consultations with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, just three days after the referendum vote. 

Erdogan’s position was predictable and blustery, including when he said, “No one has a right to throw our region into the fire,” as Yekaterina Chulkovskaya reports. But Putin sought to dial it down, and instead referred to the Russian Foreign Ministry’s statement, which included the phrase “Moscow respects the national aspirations of the Kurds” and the hope for a “constructive and respectful dialogue, with a view to devising a mutually acceptable formula of coexistence within a single Iraqi state,” as reported by Jasper Mortimer.

Putin likely implored Erdogan to back off his threat to shut down the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. Rosneft, the Russian state oil company, expects the pipeline to be open for business, and Moscow expects revenues from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as a return on its investment. Without the pipeline, open borders or payments from Baghdad to Erbil, the KRG will go broke, a disaster for the Russian venture.

Putin may have had some effect on Erdogan, who has threatened economic sanctions, conducted joint exercises with Iraq troops on the border and claims he will now only deal with Iraqi authorities in Baghdad, freezing out the KRG. Two days before Putin’s arrival, Erdogan threatened “to close the oil taps, all [their] revenues will vanish and they will not be able to find food when our trucks stop going to northern Iraq." Following Putin’s visit, the Turkish government seemed to somewhat hedge on that threat, saying it would avoid targeting civilians in whatever retaliatory steps it takes.

Putin may have an ally in the Turkish business community, which is seeking to mitigate the economic costs of any retaliation against the Kurdistan Region, as Mortimer writes. Turkey exported $4.5 billion worth of goods through the Habur border crossing the first six months of this year, Mahmut Bozarslan reports, and Turkish contractors are doing over $5 billion in business annually in Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey’s second largest market for contractors after Turkmenistan.

Putin can hardly count on either Erdogan’s restraint or for the Turkish president to defer to economic rationality in making his decision. Turkey’s opposition to the Kurdistan Region’s independence is crystal clear and void of caveats. Indeed, the good relations between Ankara and Erbil over the past decade were more the exception than the rule. The independence referendum has put back into play Kirkuk, where there is a sizable Turkmen population. Ankara is now lined up with Baghdad in seeking to assure that control of the oil-rich area stays with the central government.

But a hard line on the KRG could backfire for Turkey. Fehim Tastekinwrites that the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which Turkey considers a terrorist group, could benefit if Barzani is weakened. “Boosted by the Kurdish autonomy drive in northern Syria and its defense of Sinjar’s Yazidis against the Islamic State (IS), the PKK stands a chance of gaining a greater foothold in Iraqi Kurdistan. Existing power balances and traditional politics based on kinship ties prevent the PKK from getting mass popular support, but things may change if sanctions weaken Barzani’s administration. The PKK has been organizing silently in Kirkuk lately, which Ankara must have noted. According to Al-Monitor’s sources in Kirkuk, the PKK’s presence there is no more than 500 people, but the sympathy net might expand in the event of turmoil. Hence, a scenario where the PKK fills a vacuum in the area should be also factored in as a counterweight in the calculations.”

If this were not enough, it is Iran, rather than Turkey, that will be the final arbiter of Putin’s ambitions in Iraq and the region. Like Turkey, Iran will seek to prevent the Iraqi Kurdish model from spreading to its own Kurdish population. Tehran may be ready and willing to commit its Popular Mobilization Units to back Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi if he decides to deploy forces to Kirkuk. Such a move by Abadi would be popular among Arab Iraqis and likely stave off the political challenge of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Indeed, if events take this course, one might even imagine a state of emergency and a postponement of Iraq’s general elections scheduled for April 2018. It goes without saying that Iran has little interest in supporting Russian efforts to expand Russia's share of the international gas market via Rosneft’s deal with the KRG.

Putin has forged a fragile consensus with Iran and Turkey on cease-fires in Syria, and he can’t afford to lose either Iran or Turkey, or both, and maintain his position. There is no Russian military muscle to flex in Iraq, as it has in Syria, especially compared with the assets of Turkey and Iran there. As we wrote here earlier this summer, the referendum has revealed the limits, rather than the extent, of Barzani’s influence and leverage with Baghdad and the region. If the Kurdistan Region faces hardship or conflict as a result of the referendum, Barzani could be blamed or weakened in the ensuing fallout. 
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Putin has much at risk, but is not without options, in contemplating his next moves. If he misplays his hand in northern Iraq by banking on a weakened Barzani, he may end up finding himself exposed and on defense in both Syria and Iraq, and at odds with Iran and Turkey — the worst of all worlds. Or he can tactfully shift toward the Iran-Turkey alignment, which is gaining traction and strength, quietly distancing himself from dependence on Barzani while opening discussions with Baghdad to pursue Russia’s energy interests in northern Iraq. As this column observed in August, Putin’s grip on events in Syria increasingly depend on Turkey and especially Iran. “Russia might therefore undertake an outwardly passive and inwardly supportive role that allows the regional parties to take the initiative against the Syrian Kurds or others,” we wrote. The same can be said for his approach to the Iraqi Kurds.

Pakistani foreign minister: ‘We don’t have the assets to match’ Haqqanis and LeT
Pakistani Foreign Minister Khawaja Asif accused the United States of creating jihadist groups such as the Haqqani Network and Lashkar-e-Taiba, and supporting them to this day.

Taliban retakes district in Afghan northwest​
The district of Kohistan in Faryab province has changed hands twice over the past several months.

CIPHER BRIEF

Arif Rafiq, a fellow at the Centre for Global Policy and the Middle East Institute, two Washington think tanks, said the Pakistan Army did not see itself as facing a “you’re either with us or against us” moment, as it did in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda attacks on the US. The attacks were planned by terrorists based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where Osama bin Laden was subsequently killed by US special forces in May 2011. Nor is Pakistan as vulnerable to US pressure as it was in 2009, when TTP insurgents overran much of northwest Pakistan, he said.

It took 200,000 troops until 2015 to quell the insurgency, although TTP insurgents continue to launch terrorist attacks from new havens in eastern Afghanistan.

China in the middle: Pakistan trade corridor under spotlight after Indian ‘spy’ gets death sentence.

“The Pakistan of today is not the Pakistan of 2009. It is far more secure, its economy is much healthier, and the relationship with China is more robust and multidimensional,” Rafiq said. “Since the bin Laden raid, Pakistan has diversified its relations with other countries, bolstering ties with Qatar, Russia, and Turkey. It has weaned itself off a dependence on the US and added layers of insulation from American pressure. The Pakistan of today has options and it is likely to strengthen its alliance with China in response to US pressure.”

http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2108342/trump-driving-pakistan-deeper-chinas-orbit

US troops abandon military base in Syrian desert
​US military forces and their allied Arab fighters evacuated the Zakf base in southern Syria and relocated to the larger Tanf base following a deal between the United States and Russia, rebel sources said on Tuesday. Zakf had been set up to stop the Syrian regime’s advance toward the Iraqi border from the north of Tanf. Most Iran-backed troops that support Bashar al-Assad's regime have since left the area around Tanf as the fighting has shifted to Deir ez-Zor. 

In the Warlords' Shadow: Special Operations Forces, the Afghans, and Their Fight Against the Taliban by Daniel R. Green. PART 1 of 3.

In 2010, U.S. special operations forces (SOF) in Afghanistan began a new and innovative program to fight the Taliban insurgency using the movement's structure and strategy against it. The Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police initiative consisted of U.S. Army Special Forces and U.S. Navy SEAL teams embedding with villagers to fight the Taliban holistically.

By enlisting Afghans in their own defense, organizing the local populace, and addressing their grievances with the Afghan government, SOF was able to defeat the Taliban’s military as well as its political arm. Combining the traditions of U.S. Army Special Forces with the lessons learned in the broader SOF community from years of counterinsurgency work in Iraq and Afghanistan, this new approach fundamentally changed the terms of the conflict with the Taliban. However, little has been written about this initiative outside of the special operations community until now.

In this first-hand account of how the Village Stability Operations program functioned, Daniel R. Green provides a long-term perspective on how SOF stabilized the southern Afghan province of Uruzgan, the site of the Pashtun uprising against the Taliban in 2001 led by Hamid Karzai, future president of Afghanistan. In the Warlords’ Shadow offers a comprehensive overview of how SOF adapted to the unique demands of the local insurgency and is a rare, inside look at how special operations confronted the Taliban by fighting a “better war” and in so doing fundamentally changed the course of the war in Afghanistan.
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https://www.amazon.com/Warlords-Shadow-Special-Operations-Afghans/dp/161251815X/ref=la_B0055JCJWS_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1505537847&sr=1-1

US drones strike jihadists in Pakistan
The US is likely to step up drone strikes in Pakistan after President Trump accused Pakistan of harboring and supporting jihadist groups last month.

Hamza bin Laden tries to rally jihadists in Syria

In a new message, Hamza bin Laden praises the jihadists fighting to establish an "Islamic government" in Syria. But he warns that their enemies seek to "divide" their "ranks."

America’s Afghanistan Strategy: 
Pakistan Is the Source of the Stalemate, Not the Scapegoat for It
By Robert Cassidy, RealClearDefense: “In Afghanistan, defeat would indeed be worse than persevering with what will now be a modest increase in capacity and an ostensibly genuine regional strategy.”

Taliban gathers momentum and credibility. @billroggio @thomasjoscelyn

The video (reproduced above) was originally published by Ahmet Yar, an independent Afghan journalist. You can see Taliban fighters walking throughout the district center and numerous destroyed Afghan police vehicles.

It is unclear if, three weeks after Gomal was overrun, if the district center is still under Taliban control.

This incident highlights the extreme difficulties in attempting to discern the status of Afghan districts. Sadly, far more often than not, Taliban claims are far more credible than those of the Afghan government.

As I have noted in the past, the fact that the Taliban doesn’t claim to control important districts such as Panjwai and Zhari in Kandahar is a sign that the group appears to be presenting an accurate picture of what it controls or contests. Panjwai and Zhari are the birthplaces of the Taliban, and the Taliban has every incentive to claim some measure of control of these two key districts. Instead, the Taliban states that Panjwai and Zhari are completely under government control.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/09/video-shows-taliban-overran-district-center-in-afghan-east.php