· 1. Was it not the US which created, or assisted the creation of the Taliban, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989), and pushed the Pakistan Government and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to sustaining the Taliban?
· 2. Was it not the US Government which demanded that the Pakistan Government use its military to break the historically-guaranteed boundaries of the Federally- Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) of Pakistan in order to find al-Qaida leaders allegedly being given safe-haven there? And, as predicted by Pakistani and British officials, did this demand by the US not lead to the flooding of angry Pashtuns into the mainstream of Pakistan, contributing to the destabilization of the country?
· 3. Why did the US gradually transform the Taliban in Afghanistan into the “main enemy”? Clearly, the Taliban resisted the US-led invasion of Afghanistan (and lost power there as a result), essentially transforming the Taliban into “the enemy”. But it remains significant that the Taliban itself has not, like al-Qaida and other jihadist groups, transformed itself into a global movement targeting the US.
· 4. Why is the US in Afghanistan? What is the end-state desired by US policies? Does the US seek to stop Afghanistan being a haven for anti-US terrorists? [And, if so, is it not clear that the past 16 years of operations — now being repeated into the future — have not achieved that goal?] Did the US wish to preserve its post-Cold War entry up into Central Asia where it hoped to capitalize on possible alliances with Central Asian former Soviet states? And if that is the case, has not the past 16 years seen the US position in Central Asia consistently decline?
· 5. How does the US expect to continue to sustain meaningful military operations in Afghanistan if it alienates Pakistan to the point that it will refuse to allow US transit access? The US suspension of $350-million in “military aid” and purchases to Pakistan in recent months, and the McMaster-Mattis speech by Trump, had resulted, by August 27, 2017, in Pakistan Foreign Minister Khawaja Asif canceling the visit to the country by US Acting Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Alice Wells. But the Russian and People’s Republic of China governments came to Pakistan’s defense as a result of the US speech.
· 6. Is it not clear that the PRC’s major overland link to the Indian Ocean and to its African and Middle Eastern resources and markets is via the Karakoram Highway and the port of Gwadar in Pakistan? And that by attacking Pakistan, the US not only loses its logistical access through the country to Afghanistan, it drives Pakistan into consolidating its strategic ties with the PRC? This not only damages the US strategic posture, it also damages India’s chances of ever being able to work with Pakistan to have overland access to the markets and resources of Central Asia.
The policy President Trump just announced in his address to the nation is yet another change in the kaleidoscopic strategy the US has pursued in Afghanistan since 9/11, nonetheless it is largely a positive one, concludes Frederick W. Kagan in an AEIdeas blog. The new plan seeks to reverse the focus on withdrawal that characterized Obama’s approach after 2011, establish a reasonable definition of success, and begin to make available the resources necessary to achieve such a success. Read Kagan's detailed analysis of the new strategy here.
A key part of the president’s new approach entails putting additional pressure on Pakistan, which is criticized for supporting terrorist groups that attack US and allied forces in neighboring Afghanistan. In a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed, Sadanand Dhume argued that this administration can be successful where others failed by implementing a strategy that includes targeted sanctions on certain Pakistani officials, sharper US public messaging to emphasize that we hold no grudges against the Pakistani people, and ultimately, a process that designates Pakistan as a state sponsor of terror. Continue here.
However, could the strategy of increasing pressure on Pakistan backfire? John R. Bolton argues that putting too much pressure on Pakistan risks further destabilizing the already volatile country, tipping it into the hands of domestic radical Islamists. Not to mention that Pakistan likely possesses more than 100 nuclear weapons. Read the full piece here.